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Executive compensation and the EVA and MVA 
performance of South African listed companies
J.H.vH. de Wet
3A B S T R A C T
6The media regularly report a growing incidence of non-alignment of 
executive pay and performance, and in some cases, no link between 
the two whatsoever. The advent of new measures of shareholder 
wealth such as economic value added (EVA) and market value added 
(MVA) have allowed some companies to link executive remuneration 
to shareholder wealth creation. The purpose of this study is to 
test the relationship between executive remuneration of South 
African listed companies and EVA and MVA, as well as traditional 
performance measures such as return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). The findings indicate that there is indeed a significant 
relationship between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA, but 
that the correlation is better between executive remuneration and 
ROA and ROE. It is concluded that South African companies need 
to shift the emphasis away from traditional performance measures 
to value-creation measures when designing and implementing 
executive compensation plans.
7Key words: executive compensation, economic value added (EVA), market value added 
(MVA), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC)
Introduction
1This study investigates the existence and strength, if any, of the relationship between 
executive compensation and different measures of financial performance. Both 




traditional accounting measures such as ROA and ROE and the newer shareholder 
value-creation measures such as EVA and MVA are used as independent variables 
that impact on executive compensation. Based on a sample of South African listed 
companies and data for the five years from 2006 to 2010, it was found that there is 
a significant relationship between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA, but 
that there is a stronger relationship between executive remuneration and ROA and 
ROE.
In recent years, few issues have sparked more ongoing controversy than executive 
compensation. The topic of executive pay has been highly publicised in the media for 
some time, and a large volume of research related to it has seen the light, with the 
bulk of contributions coming from the USA, Canada, the UK and Europe. In the 
wake of the economic recession that took hold in 2008, some analysts such as Mueller 
(2006: 625) cited excessive directors’ remuneration as a key contributing factor. The 
remuneration of management comes in many different guises, which include basic 
salaries, bonuses, share purchase plans and share option plans, as well as other perks 
that are sometimes hard to quantify. Mueller (2006: 625) remarked that the Enron, 
WorldCom and Parmalat scandals involved, among other things, large loans to 
managers at negligible interest rates.
Colvin (2008: 12) referred to “CEOs getting staggering pay despite big problems at 
their companies” and the need for compensation to line up with performance. In an 
article entitled ‘The wages of sin’ by Xiaoning (2009: 12), it was reported that Chinese 
investors were outraged by reports of senior executives of loss-making companies who 
rewarded themselves with huge compensation packages. The same outcry against 
excessive directors’ remuneration has been heard from across the globe, and South 
Africa has been no exception. Trump (2005) quoted South African executive pay 
analyst, Mark Bussin, asking, “Where has the link gone between performance and 
pay?” Rose (2009: 20) reported on directors of top South African companies receiving 
bonuses even when profits dropped by substantial margins.  
Structure of the paper
1The paper is organised according to the following structure:
• Literature study;
• EVA and MVA as performance measures of choice;
• Research questions and hypotheses;
• Research method and data; 
• Results and interpretation; and
• Conclusions.
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Literature study
1Agency theory, viewing the shareholders as the principals and the management 
as the agents, is the golden thread that runs through past research on executive 
compensation and performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that even under 
the assumption that a manager owns all the shares of a company, he/she is unlikely to 
maximise the value of the firm. Agency costs, such as incentive schemes, are therefore 
incurred by companies to motivate management to act in the interests of the owners 
and maximise shareholder wealth on a sustainable basis. McKnight, Milonas, Travlos 
and Weir (2009: 22) stated that one way to reduce agency costs is to have effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. They also commented that the publication of 
Best Practices by the Cadbury Committee in the UK in 1992 resulted in a worldwide 
wave of reforms in the corporate governance systems. Fama (1980: 288), elaborating 
on agency problems, explained that the separation of ownership and control can be an 
efficient form of economic organisation. According to Fama (1980: 289), competition 
from other firms will cause a specific firm to spontaneously develop mechanisms 
that will efficiently govern the performance of the combined team of employees, as 
well as that of the individual members. Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome and Weintrop 
(2007: 75) reached the conclusion that overall, executive pay decreases as corporate 
governance structures become stronger. 
Although agency theory has been the dominant force behind efforts to link 
executive pay and performance, there have been some researchers questioning the 
validity of this view. Bruce, Buck and Main (2005: 1504) argued that theoretical 
developments in institutional theory indicate that the agency theory view of pay and 
performance may be an overly narrow focus. They advocate the use of three theories 
as different ‘lenses’ to look at executive remuneration, namely the principal-agent, 
executive power and stewardship/stakeholder theories. According to McConvill 
(2006: 425), the stewardship theory postulates that managers focus on intrinsic 
rewards that are not easily quantified and concludes that the pay-for-performance 
principle is flawed because it fails to recognise the broader motivations of human 
nature. Dittman and Maug (2007: 303) concluded that the standard principal-agent 
model cannot explain observed executive compensation contracts.
Past research investigating the link between executive remuneration and 
performance reflects a lack of consensus (Bruce et al. 2005: 1493). In the ensuing 
sections, some of the research sources supporting the link between executive pay and 
performance are briefly overviewed. Murphy (1985: 40) found a strong link between 
executive compensation and corporate performance in terms of shareholder returns 
and growth in firm sales. Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987: 65) used chief 
executives officers’ (CEO) pay as a proxy for executive compensation, and their study 
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concluded that CEO pay is more responsive to performance in owner-controlled 
firms with dominant shareholders. Main (1991: 227) found evidence of executive 
remuneration policy having an impact on the alignment between the interests of 
executives and those of shareholders. In a study by Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2000: 
15) based on companies listed in the UK for the period 1985 to 1995, the findings 
indicated that directors’ pay is positively related to shareholder returns, but not to 
earnings per share (EPS). 
Fatemi, Desai and Katz (2003: 177) found executive remuneration to have a 
strong positive relationship with MVA and a weaker positive relationship with EVA. 
The links between executive remuneration and both MVA and EVA were found 
to be better than for traditional performance measures such as ROA. In a study by 
Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou (2006: 495) on the remuneration of Australian 
CEOs, a positive and statistically significant pay–performance relationship was 
found. These results were reported to be consistent with international findings for 
firms in the USA, UK and Canada. Zhu (2007: 218) used a database of 986 listed 
Chinese enterprises and found a positive correlation between top management 
remuneration and ROE, total assets and the numbers in top management. Kato, 
Kim and Lee (2007: 52) documented a significant relationship between the cash 
compensation of Korean executives and stock market performance. Buck, Liu, and 
Skovoroda (2008: 15) reported that the pay–performance elasticity for Chinese 
companies was almost identical to that of similar findings in the USA. Cunat and 
Guadalupe (2009: 504) found that in the banking and financial sectors, deregulation 
and the increase in competition led to more reliance on performance-related pay. 
Frydman and Saks (2010: 2131) disclosed in their study of a long-term perspective 
of executive compensation from 1936 to 2005 that the relationship between pay and 
firm size was weak between the 1940s and the 1970s, but that the relationship has 
been much stronger since then as managerial incentives increased.
Some researchers did not find significant positive links between remuneration 
and performance. For instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990: 261), after analysing the 
remuneration of 2 000 CEOs, concluded that the relation between CEO wealth and 
shareholder wealth “was small and had fallen by an order of magnitude in the last 50 
years”. O’Neill and Iob (1999: 74) analysed Australian listed companies and found 
that there was little evidence to suggest a consistent trend linking executive pay to 
company performance. Alshimmiri (2004: 117) investigated the real estate investment 
trust (REIT) sector in the Arabic Emirates and found that there is a negative 
relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance in terms 
of ROA and ROE. Abdullah (2006: 172) reported that directors’ remuneration in 
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Malaysian companies is not associated with profitability as measured by ROA, but is 
related to growth and size. 
Mueller (2006: 625) commented that managerial incomes in the USA increased 
by far more than could be accounted for by increases in managerial productivity 
in the 1990s. He also concluded that company size and not profitability is the best 
predictor of managerial compensation. Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2007: 793) 
also found that firm size has a significant impact on executive remuneration and 
that the responsiveness of executive pay to firm performance is much smaller than 
to firm size. In a study conducted in the Netherlands, Duffhues and Kabir (2008: 
58) found no evidence of a positive pay–performance relationship and concluded 
that many directors receive pay for reasons unrelated to performance. Fernandes 
(2008: 40) performed a study on Portuguese companies and reported that there is no 
significant link between executive pay and shareholders’ performance for companies 
with one or more non-executive board members. He did, however, find a positive 
pay–performance relationship for the subset of companies without non-executive 
board members. Gabaix and Landier (2008: 93) reported that CEO pay between 1980 
and 2003 can be linked strongly to the sixfold increase in the market capitalisation of 
large companies during the period.
Other international research of note on executive remuneration is now discussed 
briefly. Pass (2003: 27), as well as Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2003: 1723), 
researched the impact of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) on performance in the 
UK. Pass (2003: 27) found that the majority of LTIP schemes were undemanding 
and rewarded average rather than exceptional performance. Buck et al. (2003: 
1723) concluded that LTIPs were associated with reductions in the sensitivity of 
executives’ total rewards to shareholder returns and therefore questioned their 
effectiveness. Simms (2004: 45) quoted Colin Melvin, corporate governance director 
at a UK pension management company, as saying, “… the entire system of executive 
remuneration in the UK is flawed and threatens the health of the economy” and, 
“The structure needs overhauling, and the unholy alliance of ambitious remuneration 
consultants, spineless remuneration committees, supine institutional investors and 
greedy executives needs recalibrating.” Peng and Röell (2008: 175) found that option-
based executive compensation causes executives to focus too much on the short-term 
share price. Walker (2010: 472) also found that executive compensation in the United 
States is inadequately linked to long-term company performance.
Jensen and Murphy (2004: 98) undertook a comprehensive study of executive 
remuneration in the USA and suggested that there is “substantial evidence that we 
can do better in future” and that “the changes required to put the balance back in the 
remuneration system will not be easy to implement”. Hovy (2005: 38) inferred that 
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global performance-based equity plans would, in the foreseeable future, be the most 
viable mechanism to align executive performance to shareholder wealth creation. 
Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006: 421) provided evidence of excessive executive 
compensation associated with firm under-performance. Wilkinson (2009: 41) 
expressed the opinion that it must be ensured that executives get the right rewards, 
in the right circumstances, for the right reasons. Sun, Zhao and Yang (2010: 780) 
commented that the pay–performance relationship appears to be the most studied 
topic in Asian research on executive compensation and highlighted numerous 
sources linking compensation to performance. Jensen and Murphy (2010) found that 
the structuring of compensation packages to provide big rewards for outstanding 
performance and meaningful penalties for poor performance has proved to be an 
elusive goal.
A brief discussion of local South African research on the topic is now given. 
Bussin (2003: 20) addressed agency theory and pointed out the need for appropriate 
corporate governance and transparency. Blair, Bussin and De Beer (2006a: 65) 
commented from a consultant’s perspective that most South African executive 
remuneration schemes at the time did not include performance requirements that 
are properly aligned with shareholder measures. Blair, Bussin and De Beer (2006b: 
27) advised that the best and most tax-efficient solution for a long-term mechanism 
is one where fully paid-up shares are financed through long-term cash bonuses. King 
(2009: 48) specified that companies should adopt remuneration policies and practices 
that create value for the company in the long term. Furthermore, these policies and 
practices should be aligned with the company’s strategy, be reviewed regularly and 
be linked to the executive’s contribution to company performance. The international 
accounting standard IFRS 2 (2009) became mandatory in South Africa on 1 January 
2009; it specifies that an entity must reflect in its profit and loss and financial position 
the effects of share-based payment transactions, including expenses associated 
with transactions in which share options are granted to employees. Adherence to 
IFRS 2 not only ensures that companies disclose the full impact of the cost of share-
based remuneration, but also adds to the transparency required for good corporate 
governance. 
Authers (2010), quoting from a new book entitled Value by a group of McKinsey 
consultants, concluded that it is ‘crazy’ to judge executives by earnings per share, 
or by their company’s share price. Blaine (2010) quoted executive remuneration 
consultant Mark Bussin as saying that local South African banker remuneration 
is still conservative compared to international companies. Van Zyl Smit and Nel 
(2010) advised that remuneration policies should embrace the three basic principles 
of appropriateness, fairness and effectiveness and should be tightly aligned with the 
63 
Executive compensation and EVA and MVA performance of SA listed companies
long-term value and soundness of the firm. Audit and consulting group PWC (2011) 
stressed in their annual report on directors’ remuneration that organisations must be 
able to indicate a clear link between the incentive awarded and the performance of 
the organisation. 
In summary, it is clear that past research about executive remuneration and 
performance has yielded mixed, inconclusive results and that much creative thinking 
would be required in future to establish sound, innovative remuneration policies 
that are synchronised with the long-term strategies of firms. One is also left with 
the impression that performance will remain a key requirement in order to justify 
executive remuneration. In the next section, the ways in which performance can be 
measured more appropriately are discussed. 
EVA and MVA as performance measures of choice
1The literature study reveals that past research on executive remuneration and 
performance, by and large, used traditional accounting performance measures such 
as EPS, ROA and ROE to measure corporate financial performance. The main 
flaws of these measures are that they do not reflect the risk involved to a company as 
embodied in the cost of own capital (equity) and that they are prone to manipulation. 
Ground-breaking work by Stewart (1991) and Stern (1993), working together in the 
Stern Stewart Consulting firm, introduced the concepts of EVA and MVA as better 
measures of corporate performance. EVA is an internal risk-adjusted measure of 
performance that takes into account the full weighted average cost of a company’s 
capital; it yields a positive result if the company earns after-tax operating returns that 
exceed the cost of capital. MVA is determined by subtracting the adjusted book values 
of the fixed assets and net working capital from the market value of the shares and 
long-term borrowings. Theoretically, MVA is also the present value of all future EVAs 
(Stern 1993: 36). It must be borne in mind that MVA is affected not only by what the 
company does (EVA), but also by external factors that influence its share price and 
that the company has no control over. However, it is believed that companies that 
manage to earn positive and growing EVAs consistently will maximise their MVA 
in the long run.
Since the introduction of EVA and MVA, numerous research sources have 
concluded that EVA has a stronger correlation with MVA (or shareholder returns) 
than the other accounting measures tested. Those in support of EVA include O’Byrne 
(1996: 119), Uyemura, Kantor and Pettit (1996: 98) and Grant (1996: 44; 1997: 39). 
Ross (1998: 122), Ehrbar and Stewart (1999: 19), Krafft and Ravix (2005: 132) and 
Sharma and Kumar (2010: 205) provide anecdotal evidence of the widespread 
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implementation of EVA and MVA by top companies in the USA as well as Europe, 
Latin America, Asia, and even New Zealand and South Africa. However, following 
the initial strong support for EVA, some research results appeared, indicating that 
EVA does not in fact have superior explanatory power in relation to MVA, compared 
to the other traditional accounting measures. This category of researchers includes 
Biddle, Bowen and Wallace (1999: 69), and Kyriazis and Anastassis (2007: 94). 
Fatemi et al. (2003: 171) produced some innovative work by classifying companies 
into four groups, depending on their level of EVA and MVA. Companies are first 
sorted into three groups of equal number in terms of both EVA and MVA. Then four 
categories are discerned, namely high EVA and high MVA (winners), low EVA and 
high MVA (holders of real options), high EVA and low MVA (problem children) and 
low EVA and low MVA (losers), as depicted in Figure 1.
1       High  ‘Problem  ‘Winners’
1          children’
1      EVA    ‘Losers’   ‘Holders of
1            real options’
1         Low
1          Low     High
1                   MVA
Source: Adapted from Fatemi et al. (2003: 171)
Figure 1: EVA and MVA grid
The categorisation of companies according to the grid in Figure 1 will be 
used to determine whether there is a difference in the remuneration/performance 
relationships for the various groups of companies. In concluding the discussion of 
EVA and MVA, the author shares the view of Shiely (1996) and Fatemi et al. (2003: 
161), who consider EVA and MVA to be reasonable proxies for the measurement of 
owner wealth maximisation while taking into account the relative risk-based costs of 
doing so. The research questions and hypotheses arising from the literature study are 
addressed in the next section. 
Research questions and hypotheses
1The first research question is whether there is a positive relationship between 
executive remuneration and EVA and MVA. This hypothesis is therefore:
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H
1
 =  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between executive 
remuneration and EVA and MVA. 
A second related research question is whether the relationship between executive 
remuneration and EVA and MVA is stronger than for executive remuneration and 
the traditional measures of ROA and ROE. Therefore the second hypothesis is:
H
2 
=  The relationship between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA is 
stronger than that of executive remuneration and ROA and ROE.
The third research question is whether the relative levels of EVA and MVA, 
according to the EVA and MVA grid, have an impact on the strength of the 
remuneration and performance relationships. The third hypothesis is therefore:
H
3 
=  There is a significantly different relationship between executive remuneration 
and EVA and MVA for the four categories of companies.
In the next section, the research method and data are discussed.
Research method and data
1The research method entails using data obtained from the financial data provider 
McGregor BFA and applying regression analysis to test the hypotheses as stated. 
Certain additional statistical tests are performed to test the robustness of the data. 
The companies selected for the study are all listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE) South Africa, and the period covered is the five-year period from 
2006 to 2010. 
The dependent variable, total directors’ remuneration (TDR), includes basic salary 
and bonus, as well as other remuneration such as share-based payments and options. 
The five independent variables believed to influence directors’ remuneration are 
ROA (after-tax percentage), ROE (after-tax percentage), standardised EVA (SEVA), 
standardised MVA (SMVA) and weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Both 
EVA, which is calculated as an annual amount in its raw form, and MVA, which 
is calculated as a cumulative amount in its raw form, were standardised in order to 
control for firm-size effects. The invested capital (ICbeg) at the beginning of the year 
was used in the standardisation process as follows:
SEVA  = EVA / ICbeg
SMVA = (MVAt - MVAt-1) / ICbeg
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Hence, for EVA, the standardised version, SEVA, is calculated by dividing the 
annual EVA amount by the invested capital at the beginning of the year. For MVA, 
the standardised version, SMVA, is determined by dividing the difference between 
the MVA at the end of the year and the MVA at the beginning of the year by the 
invested capital at the beginning of the year. WACC is included as a proxy for risk in 
order to control for company risk differences, and it is expected that the higher levels 
of overall company risk as expressed by WACC would lead to directors requiring 
higher levels of remuneration (Fama 1980). 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, and the correlations between 
the different variables are specified in Table 2.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
TDR SEVA SMVA ROE ROA WACC
 Mean  17215.13 –0.061575 –7.416888  11.27938  12.91806  11.34353
 Median  10456.00  0.014200  0.021020  17.56830  14.07680  10.99010
 Maximum  657949.0  4.352571  1012.509  469.5515  118.2517  28.91060
 Minimum  0.000000 –13.38705 –7267.529 –1728.504 –600.0000  2.423700
 Std. Dev.  28096.67  0.745818  252.9926  93.98454  32.98887  3.760509
It is noted that both the means for SEVA and SMVA were negative for the five-year 
period 2006 to 2010, indicating that on average, South African companies destroyed 
wealth on an annual basis in terms of an internal measure, EVA, and in terms of an 
external measure, MVA.
Table 2: Correlations
TDR SEVA SMVA ROE ROA WACC
TDR 1.0000 0.0772 0.0193 0.0743 0.0692 –0.0224
SEVA 0.0772 1.0000 0.1036 0.0780 0.3076 –0.1067
SMVA 0.0193 0.1036 1.0000 0.0143 0.2724 –0.0047
ROE 0.0743 0.0780 0.0143 1.0000 0.3103 –0.0199
ROA 0.0692 0.3076 0.2724 0.3103 1.0000 0.0078
WACC –0.0224 –0.1067 –0.0047 –0.0199 0.0078 1.0000
1
A perusal of the one-on-one correlations of the variables included in the regression 
analysis in Table 2 reveals no serious co-linearity, as none of the correlation coefficients 
are significantly high.
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Results and interpretation
1In order to examine the relationship between directors’ remunerations and relevant 
performance indicators, a panel data approach was used. Although panel data have 
limitations such as design and data collection problems, its advantages include:
• controlling for heterogeneity amongst companies;
• allowing for more degrees of freedom;
• better ability to study dynamics of adjustment;
• ability to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than purely 
cross-section or time series;
• more informative data; more variability; less co-linearity among the variables; and
• more efficiency of the estimators.
All the models were run with total director remuneration as the dependent 
variable, and Table 3 shows that Model 1 used SEVA and WACC as the independent 
variables. 
Table 3: Model 1 SEVA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
SEVA 2130.302 536.6753 3.969443 0.0001
WACC –121.2447 53.51580 –2.265588 0.0237
C 16094.49 877.8626 18.33372 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.043928     Mean dependent var 41741.80
Adjusted R-squared 0.041876     S.D. dependent var 42618.83
S.E. of regression 26276.86     Sum squared resid 6.44E+11
F-statistic 21.41087     Durbin-Watson stat 0.615291
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared –0.002954     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.39E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.652357
Although the adjusted R-squared of approximately 4.2% of this model represents 
weak correlation, the t-value of SEVA of 3.97 (rounded) indicates that the coefficient 
of this independent variable is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient WACC 
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was significant at the 10% level. Contrary to expectations, the negative coefficient 
of WACC indicates an inverse relationship between company risk and director 
remuneration. The coefficient of WACC was negative for all the models tested 
(Models 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).
Table 4 reveals that Model 2 specified SMVA and WACC as the independent 
variables. 
Table 4: Model 2 SMVA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
SMVA 1.715275 0.900020 1.905820 0.0570
WACC –211.6808 19.15809 –11.04916 0.0000
C 16969.78 602.3166 28.17419 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.010515     Mean dependent var 41920.26
Adjusted R-squared 0.008392     S.D. dependent var 42111.72
S.E. of regression 26367.30     Sum squared resid 6.48E+11
F-statistic 4.952115     Durbin-Watson stat 0.599698
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007256
Unweighted statistics
R-squared –0.008150     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.43E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.647131
The result of this model was that the strength of correlation was even weaker than 
for Model 1 with an adjusted R-squared of 0.8% (rounded). However, the coefficient 
of SMVA was found to be significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient of WACC 
proved to be significant at the 1% level.
Table 5 presents Model 3, which took ROE and WACC as the independent 
variables. 
The adjusted R-squared of 4.3% again represents a low level of correlation, but the 
coefficients of both the independent variables, namely ROE and WACC, proved to be 
significant at the 1% level.
Table 6 shows that Model 4 had ROA and WACC as independent variables. 
The coefficients of both independent variables, ROA and WACC, were found 
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Table 5: Model 3 ROE
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
ROE 23.54926 6.311432 3.731207 0.0002
WACC –211.4139 21.73779 –9.725641 0.0000
C 16614.27 743.6893 22.34034 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.045277     Mean dependent var 42136.57
Adjusted R-squared 0.043228     S.D. dependent var 43099.38
S.E. of regression 26194.60     Sum squared resid 6.39E+11
F-statistic 22.09974     Durbin-Watson stat 0.633147
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared –0.003596     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.40E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.656222
Table 6: Table 6: Model 4 ROA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
ROA 57.60806 11.14204 5.170335 0.0000
WACC –201.4130 28.16186 –7.151978 0.0000
C 16031.54 723.5053 22.15815 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.036689     Mean dependent var 41936.23
Adjusted R-squared 0.034622     S.D. dependent var 42240.71
S.E. of regression 26227.75     Sum squared resid 6.41E+11
F-statistic 17.74834     Durbin-Watson stat 0.615251
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared –0.004122     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.40E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.649970
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For Model 5, SEVA, SMVA and WACC were taken together as independent 
variables. The results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Model 5 SEVA + SMVA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
SEVA 2094.514 532.5731 3.932821 0.0001
SMVA 1.339336 0.472734 2.833167 0.0047
WACC –117.5032 54.88787 –2.140786 0.0326
C 16057.77 872.4130 18.40616 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.048582     Mean dependent var 41737.64
Adjusted R-squared 0.045516     S.D. dependent var 42619.41
S.E. of regression 26289.46     Sum squared resid 6.43E+11
F-statistic 15.84652     Durbin-Watson stat 0.618093
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared -0.002826     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.39E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.652596
The results indicate relatively weak correlation with the adjusted R-squared of 
4.6% (rounded). In this instance, both SEVA and SMVA had coefficients significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient of WACC was significant at the 10% level.
ROA, ROE and WACC were the independent variables in Model 6, as indicated 
in Table 8. 
The results of this model indicate a slightly higher level of correlation compared to 
the previous models with an adjusted R-squared of 5.4% (rounded). The coefficients 
of all three independent variables, namely ROE, ROA and WACC, were all significant 
at the 1% level.
Model 7 used SEVA, SMVA, ROA, ROE and WACC together as the independent 
variables and is presented in Table 9. 
As expected, this model that combined the independent variables proved to 
have a much stronger level of correlation with an adjusted R-squared of 19.2%. The 
coefficients of SEVA, ROE and EVA were significant at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient of WACC was significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of SMVA was 
not significant at any of the levels specified.
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Table 8: Model 6 ROE+ ROA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
ROE 16.76019 5.645954 2.968532 0.0031
ROA 38.88419 9.829294 3.955949 0.0001
WACC –198.9058 26.05519 –7.634018 0.0000
C 16013.48 719.5185 22.25583 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.057274     Mean dependent var 41915.40
Adjusted R-squared 0.054236     S.D. dependent var 42330.62
S.E. of regression 26126.81     Sum squared resid 6.36E+11
F-statistic 18.85383     Durbin-Watson stat 0.637354
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared –0.001432     Mean dependent var 17215.13
Sum squared resid 7.38E+11     Durbin-Watson stat 0.655452
Table 9: Model 7 ROA + ROE + EVA + MVA
Dependent variable: TDR
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
SEVA 1364.493 293.4727 4.649473 0.0000
SMVA 0.586469 0.652367 0.898986 0.3689
ROE 18.11460 5.687430 3.185024 0.0015
ROA 23.84458 7.717692 3.089600 0.0021
WACC –122.1917 61.26452 –1.994494 0.0464
C 15487.42 859.4844 18.01943 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.192425     Mean dependent var 42141.03
Adjusted R-squared 0.188079     S.D. dependent var 44734.69
S.E. of regression 26110.69     Sum squared resid 6.33E+11
F-statistic 44.27157     Durbin-Watson stat 0.646246
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000




Table 10: Summary of results
 Dependent variable: TDR





































































R² 0.044 0.01 0.045 0.037 0.049 0.057 0.192
Adjusted R² 0.042 0.008 0.043 0.035 0.046 0.054 0.188
Note: Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis. Heteroskedasticity corrected for.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Given the two hypotheses to be tested:
• H1: Model 5 indicates that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA. Both indicators of 
performance are positively related to total directors’ remuneration at a 1% level of 
significance. Hypothesis 1 is therefore accepted.
• H2: There appears to be a stronger relationship between executive remuneration 
and ROA and ROE than between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA. 
The adjusted R² is higher for Model 6, which estimates both ROA and ROE 
together, than for Model 5, which estimates EVA and MVA together. Hypothesis 
2 is therefore rejected. This finding is contrary to that of Fatemi et al. (2003), 
who found, based on a sample of American companies, a stronger relationship 
between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA, compared to the relationship 
between executive remuneration and ROA and ROE. From this result one may 
infer that South African companies still place a greater emphasis on performance 
as reflected by the traditional measures of ROA and ROE in determining executive 
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compensation, rather than the value-based measures of EVA and MVA. It may also 
be an indication that South African companies need to change their perception 
of what constitutes good performance in determining directors’ remuneration so 
that value-creation rather than accounting profit is incentivised.
Robustness tests
1A battery of tests was run on the different models to check the validity of the results:
1. Endogeneity (or misspecification) of each pooled model: Endogeneity refers 
to a correlation between the error term and one or more of the independent 
variables. In other words, there are individual or time effects that are correlated 
with the independent variables. For this the Hausman (1978) test is used. Under 
the Hausman test, the H0 is E(uit|Xit ) = 0E(uit|Xit ) = 0  (i.e. the error term 
and independent variables are uncorrelated). In terms of data analysis and 
modelling, the presence of endogeneity is of great concern. If endogeneity 
is found to be present in any of the models, this would call for the use of an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. Fortunately all models estimated in this 
paper passed the endogeneity test (i.e. they are correctly specified).
2. Serial correlation: Serial correlation (SC) refers to a situation where a variable 
is correlated with its own lags or the lags of other dependent variables in the 
model. The Durbin-Watson test is used to test for serial correlation in panel data. 
Unfortunately, due to the outliers in the WACC data that had to be removed, 
the test for serial correlation could not be done, as there were now insufficient 
observations in the panel. 
3. Heteroskedasticity: This refers to non-constant variances related to the 
error term in the model. This is a problem since it means that there is great 
variability in the model (i.e. parameter estimates do not converge to their actual 
values). This problem is corrected by using White’s cross-section coefficient 
variance method. The White cross-section method assumes that the errors are 
contemporaneously (cross-sectionally) correlated and this weighting system 
corrects for heteroskedasticity. The method treats the pool regression as a 
multivariate regression (with an equation for each cross section) and computes 
robust standard errors for the system of equations. Cross-section weights were 
also incorporated in the estimations. In the EViews programme, this will 
estimate a feasible GLS specification assuming the presence of cross-section 
heteroskedasticity as well. The test itself could not be conducted on the models 
because of the outliers in the WACC data that had to be removed. However, the 
models were still corrected for potential heteroskedasticity as this hardly alters 
the structure and features of the data (Gujarati 1995).
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4. Stationarity: A non-stationary process has a variable variance and a mean that 
does not return to a long-run mean over time, whereas a stationary process 
reverts around a constant long-term mean and has a constant variance 
independent of time. Using non-stationary time series data in financial models 
produces unreliable results and may indicate a relationship between two 
variables where one does not exist. The solution is to transform the data so as 
to become stationary, and this done by done by differencing. The disadvantage 
of differencing is that the process loses one observation each time the difference 
is taken. The panel approach also helps, though the panel unit root test s have 
been criticised because they assume cross-sectional independence. All tests used 
in this analysis have H0 of non-stationarity (Baltagi 2008: 137–168). Unit root 
tests on variables were done at ‘Level with individual intercept and trend’. The 
Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test and the Breitung t-statistic assume a common 
unit process for all cross-sections, whereas the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), ADF 
Fisher and PP Fisher assume individual unit root process for cross-sections. 
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. All the variables used 
in this paper were stationary.
1The results of the robustness tests are summarised in Table 11.
Table 11: Summary of robustness tests























– – – – – – –
Stationarity TDR EVA MVA ROE ROA WACC
Levin, Lin and
Chu (LLC) test
Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
Breitung t-stat test Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
Im, Pesaran and
Shin (IPS) test
Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
ADF Fisher test Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
PP Fisher test Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary
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In an effort to discern whether different groupings of companies in terms of their 
EVA and MVA performance would lead to differing results, the data were categorised 
accordingly and the following models were regressed:
1Model 1: High SEVA and low SMVA
1Model 2: High SEVA and high SMVA
1Model 3: Low SEVA and low SMVA
1Model 4: Low SEVA and high SMVA.
The regression results are given in Table 12.
Table 12: Regression results

































F-statistic (p-value) 0.014004 ** 0.009312 *** 0.118556 0.202121
R² 0.099300 0.124490 0.062053 0.049205
Adjusted R² 0.072547 0.093949 0.031131 0.017861
Note:  Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis. Heteroskedasticity has been cor-
rected for. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 13: Robustness tests
Heteroskedasticity Serial correlation
Group 1 * No SC
Group 2 * + SC
Group 3 * + SC




From the results in Table 13, it appears that there is a significant link between 
executive compensation and the MVA of companies with high EVA. The significance 
of the link between executive remuneration and MVA was stronger for companies 
with high EVA and high MVA (group 2) than for companies with high EVA and low 
MVA (group 1). Interestingly, there is no significant link for these companies between 
executive remuneration and EVA. For the companies with low EVA, no significant 
links were found between executive remuneration and either EVA or MVA. Although 
the results were not very conclusive, one could argue that they support Hypothesis  3 
by indicating a significant difference in the strength of the relationships as stated for 
the different categories of companies. It therefore appears as if companies that are 
successful in generating high EVA take a more forward-looking approach by placing 
more emphasis on MVA when determining executive compensation.
Conclusions
1The results of the study provide evidence that there is a significant relationship 
between the executive compensation of South African listed companies and measures 
of financial performance. However, in contrast to the findings of a similar study 
by Fatemi et al. (2003) based on American companies, this South African study 
finds that there is a stronger relationship between executive remuneration and the 
traditional performance measures of ROA and ROE, compared to the relationship 
between executive remuneration and EVA and MVA. 
Furthermore, this study found a stronger relationship between executive 
compensation and EVA than between executive compensation and MVA. This is also 
contrary to the findings of Fatemi et al. (2003), who reported that the link between 
MVA and executive remuneration was stronger than that of EVA. This may be an 
indication that South African companies are starting to acknowledge EVA in their 
compensation plans, but have not yet progressed to the long-term view of shareholder 
wealth creation as represented by MVA. MVA can theoretically be proved to be the 
present value of all future EVAs that a company is expected to generate.
Another analysis that was done after categorising companies into four groups 
in terms of EVA and MVA reveals that companies with high EVA have significant 
relationships between executive remuneration and MVA. For companies with low 
EVA, no significant links could be found between executive remuneration and either 
EVA or MVA.
The difference in the findings of the two studies may be attributed to the fact that 
South African companies place a greater emphasis on traditional measures such as 
ROA and ROE when compensating executives, while their American counterparts 
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tend to rely more on EVA and MVA. South African companies also seem to take 
a short-term view by relying more on EVA than on MVA as benchmarks for 
executive compensation. From a strategic perspective, there is no question that a 
forward-looking focus based on shareholder value creation and incorporating risk, 
as embodied by EVA and MVA, is essential for a sound executive remuneration 
policy. South African companies are therefore challenged to embrace the concept of 
shareholder wealth creation in their quest to measure the performance of executives 
fairly and to remunerate them more appropriately.
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